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Case No. 20150840-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
MANUEL ANTONIO LUJAN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Reply Brief of Petitioner 
 
 Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in the respondent’s brief. 
The State does not concede any matters not addressed in the reply, but 
believes those matters are adequately addressed in the State’s opening brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEST ANNOUNCED IN RAMIREZ  
 Lujan argues that this Court should not “rearrange” the state 
constitutional analysis because the issue has not been preserved for this 
Court’s review.  Resp.Br. 22-31.  Not only was the issue not timely raised, he 
argues, but there is no reason to address the existence of a threshold inquiry 
so long as the State agrees that suggestive state action occurred in this case 
-2- 
and both parties argue the reliability factors outlined in State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).  Id. at 22-23.     
 Lujan’s preservation argument is a non-starter.  A grant of certiorari 
review permits this Court to review “the questions set forth in the petition 
or fairly included therein” and for which certiorari is granted. Utah R. App. 
P. 49(a)(4).  See also State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah 1998) (limiting 
certiorari review to the issue granted by this Court and rejecting an issue 
that was not fairly included in the cert petition); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 
(Utah 1995) (addressing on certiorari review issue subsidiary to question 
before Court).  It may also consider matters fairly included within a petition 
which the court of appeals recommends for review.  See Utah R. App. P. 
49(b).   
 The court of appeals was faced with a state constitutional challenge to 
the admission of eyewitness identification testimony.  Both the majority and 
the dissent applied the relevant Ramirez analysis but reached different 
results.  See State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App. 199.   In issuing the opinion, the 
entire panel recommended that this Court reconsider Ramirez, citing 
concerns about the “flaws inherent in the Ramirez analysis” and about 
continuing post-Ramirez research in the area.  Id. at ¶1,n.1; id. at ¶21 (Pearce, 
J., dissenting).  The Ramirez analysis cannot receive meaningful review by 
-3- 
this Court without an articulation of that analysis.  And the parties disagree 
on that interpretation.  In light of the court of appeals’ concerns, the State’s 
petition for certiorari review included a more complete articulation of its 
own interpretation of the Ramirez analysis.  Pet. 9-12.   
 The court of appeals’ erroneous application of the Ramirez analysis 
without the threshold state action step and the panel’s unanimous plea for 
review of the analysis constitute the sort of “special and important reasons” 
justifying this Court’s grant of certiorari review. Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(2).  
This Court’s order granting review was in terms sufficiently broad to 
encompass the articulation of the Ramirez analysis.  Whether the court of 
appeals erroneously applied the Ramirez test requires an articulation of the 
test.  Consequently, the state constitutional test announced in Ramirez is 
fairly included in the scope of certiorari review and is properly before this 
Court. 
 Further, the State seeks to clarify, not overrule or replace, the Ramirez 
analysis, as Lujan avers.1  Resp.Br. 28-29. The proper interpretation of 
Ramirez provides a distinct and workable state constitutional due process 
                                              
1The State opposed the replacement analysis advanced by the 
Amicus, moving to strike the amicus brief for failing to support either 
parties’ position in this appeal.  See Motion to Strike Brief of Amicus Curiae 
and Stay Briefing Schedule, filed Sept. 14, 2016.   
-4- 
analysis for the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony. But the 
lack of clarity in that analysis has generated much confusion over the years, 
and this Court’s continued silence on the matter simply fosters that 
confusion.  See State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶72 (putting off the issue simply 
“sow[s] the seeds of confusion” in the lower courts) (Lee, A.C.J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). While this case has been pending 
in this Court, the Ramirez analysis has been raised in the court of appeals in 
at least seven cases, one of which resulted in a decision that “the Utah 
Constitution does not require police misconduct—improper 
suggestiveness—as a threshold requirement in eyewitness identification 
cases.”2  State v. Gallegos, 2016 UT App 172, ¶40.  The Lujan opinion 
epitomizes the prevailing confusion in the lower courts, and the court of 
appeals has articulated its continuing frustration with the matter.  The time 
has come to clarify the test and permit courts and counsel to effectively 
analyze this type of evidence under the state constitution without the 
uncertainty and unpredictability that have arisen since Ramirez.  This case 
                                              
2Those cases include: State v. Gallegos, 2016 UT App 172, ¶40; State v. 
Aponte, Case No. 20150154-CA; State v. Craft, Case No. 20150750-CA; State v. 
Beazer, Case No. 20160029-CA; State v. Gallegos, 20150688-CA;  State v. 
Wright, Case No. 20100655-CA; and State v. Hull, Case No. 20151028-CA. 
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presents a timely and appropriate opportunity for this Court to resolve the 
confusion. 
 Finally, clarification is necessary to ensure proper application of the 
test to the facts of any given case, including this one.  Because a 
constitutional due process violation occurs only upon a finding of 
suggestive state action which prompts additional judicial scrutiny of the 
evidence, proper application of the first step of the test is imperative to a 
proper determination of constitutional admissibility.   
 Having granted certiorari review, this Court should clarify the state 
constitutional test introduced in Ramirez.   
II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD ONEY’S 
IDENTIFICATION OF LUJAN TO BE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY UNRELIABLE3  
A. The state constitutional analysis is a two-part test. 
 Absent a state action requirement, the Ramirez analysis raises an 
evidentiary question concerning the reliability of evidence to the level of a 
constitutional violation without justification.  See, e.g., Clopten, 2015 UT 82, 
¶76 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(refusing to construe state due process clause in manner different than its 
federal counterpart absent an articulated basis for such interpretation); see 
                                              
3This point responds to Lujan’s Point I, Resp.Br. 9-21. 
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also State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 688-89 (Or. 2012) (treating reliability of 
eyewitness identification testimony as state evidentiary matter that did not 
require suggestive state action needed for due process inquiry).   
 Lujan offers no basis for reading the state due process clause in any 
but the traditional sense—requiring suggestive police activity.  The silence 
in Ramirez suggests that the Court did not intend to do away with the need 
for state action.  Instead, Ramirez started with the federal test—which 
included the threshold requirement of police misconduct—and did not 
expressly reject it as it strove to distinguish the state constitutional test.  The 
parties agree that “Ramirez made a conscious departure from the federal 
model.”  Resp.Br. 25.  But that departure was not to abandon the first step of 
the federal model, as Lujan argues.  Id. at 25-26.  Instead, this Court stated 
that it established an “analytical model” for “determining the admissibility 
of arguably suggestive eyewitness identifications.”  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779.  
Then it explained that it would not be limited “to an analytical model that 
merely copies the federal” model but would “require an in-depth appraisal 
of the identification’s reliability along the lines laid out by Long.”  Id. at 780.  
Finally, it noted that its “approach departs from federal case law only to the 
degree that we find the federal analytical model scientifically unsupported.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  This plain language only alters the reliability factors 
-7- 
to require a more thorough, “in-depth appraisal” under the second step of 
the analysis.  See id.  Had it intended to extend state constitutional due 
process concerns to instances independent of state conduct, it could have 
done so explicitly. 
 The State does not contest the potential unreliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony generally.  But, absent police misconduct, the 
reliability of the evidence is a jury determination, and state constitutional 
and evidentiary safeguards effectively protect a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial without invading the jury’s province.   Pet.Br. 19, 24; State v. Clopten, 
2009 UT 84, ¶49 [Clopten I]; see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 
729 (2012).  Lujan presents no argument persuasively demonstrating 
otherwise. 
 Finally, Ramirez’s use of suggestiveness as one of the factors by which 
reliability is determined does not “plainly” eliminate it as a threshold 
inquiry.  Resp.Br. 26.  Upon a threshold finding of suggestive state action, 
the trial court is required to assess “whether under the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ the identification was [sufficiently] reliable even though the 
confrontation procedure [employed by police] was suggestive.”  Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).  To accomplish this, the trial court must 
necessarily include the details of the suggestive conduct in its evaluation of 
-8- 
the totality of the circumstances.  Nothing in Ramirez states otherwise, and 
the holding in Ramirez showed that suggestive state action does not 
necessarily require exclusion of eyewitness testimony, depending on that 
evaluation.   
B. Oney’s identification testimony was based on his 
personal knowledge, not the suggestiveness of the 
showup, and was admissible under the proper test. 
 As argued in the State’s opening brief, the arrest-site identification 
procedure used by police in this case was arguably suggestive (warranting 
its consideration under the totality of circumstances) but was less 
suggestive than the showup in Ramirez.4  The procedural factors parallel 
Ramirez, but the witness factors show Oney’s identification was the product 
of his own memory, not suggestion.  Lujan’s efforts to magnify the 
suggestibility of the showup fail to account for the facts at hand. 
1.  Circumstances favoring identification reliability.  
 Lujan contends that the showup was particularly suggestive because 
Oney’s “original memory” was of a highly stressful event: a “high-stress 
                                              
4A “showup can be as reliable as a lineup.”  Lawson, 291 P.3d at 686.  
Reliability is at its best when the showup occurs within 2 hours after the 
crime and the accused is not displayed suggestively.  National Research 
Council of the National Academies, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification, 97 (2014) at 27-28. It is believed that “the benefit of a 
fresh memory outweighs the inherent suggestiveness of the procedure.”  
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 686; Tim R. Robicheaux, Presumed Innocent? The Social 
Science of Wrongful Conviction, Lesson 7-1 (2014). 
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robbery” committed with the suggestion of a weapon.  Resp.Br. 11-13, 21.  
His support is a study of the effect of suggestion on military personnel 
involved in realistic mock POW simulations.  Id. at 12.  See C.A. Morgan III, 
et al., Misinformation Can Influence Memory for Recently Experienced, Highly 
Stressful Events, Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 36 (2013).  There is no doubt that two 
days of exposure to intensive physical, psychological, and emotional abuse 
and deprivation at the hands of multiple “interrogators” under POW 
interrogation scenarios is a “high stress” situation which was clearly tied to 
the results of identification efforts attempted 48 hours after the abuse ended.  
See Misinformation Can Influence Memory  (detailing the study and its results).  
By comparison, the claim that the relatively innocuous events of this 
robbery are sufficiently similar to such a “highly stressful event” as to 
render Oney’s identification susceptible to the suggestiveness of a showup 
thirty-five minutes after the robbery is entirely unpersuasive.  Not only did 
this scenario lack all of the stress factors of the POW study, but it lacked the 
use of a weapon.  Lujan claims that the “implied weapon” was “likely more 
distracting” for Oney than an actual weapon, but he offers no authority for 
the claim.  Resp.Br. 11.   
 Moreover, he misdirects this Court as to Oney’s “original memory,” 
pointing to the last five seconds of their interaction.  Id. at 11-21.  Oney’s 
-10- 
“original memory,” however, was the first “10 seconds” or “longer” the two 
spent face-to-face in the car door before any weapon was suggested.  
R357:39-41.  This circumstance has absolutely no correlation with the POW 
study, lacking both high stress and a weapon, implied or otherwise.  It was 
not until after this initial exposure that a weapon was implied and the stress 
level rose, although it still fell far short of the stress involved in the POW 
study.   
 As Lujan provides no evidence demonstrating that a showup has any 
adverse effects when the original memory is of a moderately stressful, 
nonviolent event, there is no reason to believe Oney’s original memory did 
not form the basis for the showup identification.  See, e.g., Lawson, 291 P.3d 
at 699-700 (showup conducted 5 hours after robbery did not contribute to 
witness’ identification of perpetrator despite possibility of stress from 
attempt by perpetrator to punch eyewitness which arose only after 
eyewitness was face-to-face with perpetrator and had clear opportunity to 
view him).5   
                                              
 5Lujan’s assertion that “fatigue was likely a factor” affecting Oney’s 
identification (Resp.Br. 13-14) lacks record support where the trial court 
ruled out any such concern.  R356:74-76;R357:15-18. Equally telling is that 
there were no other injuries, drugs, alcohol or other indicators of any 
physical, emotional, or mental impairment on Oney’s part. 
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 Additionally, Lujan’s focus on the last few seconds of the robbery 
ignores a number of favorable memory factors which arose in the first half 
of the pair’s contact and which contribute to a high degree of accuracy in 
Oney’s later identifications:  time spent observing the robber, illumination, 
physical distance, direction of gaze, distractions, and type or amount of 
attention given by the witness.  First, as a general rule, the more time spent 
observing the robber’s face during a crime, the greater the accuracy in a 
later identification.  National Research Council of the National Academies, 
Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, 97 (2014).  This 
includes increases of mere seconds.  See, e.g., Andreas Kapardis (2009), 
Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction, 43-44 (Considerations for 
Eyewitness Testimony) (referencing study finding “significantly more 
accurate recall” when exposure increased by 15 seconds).  Also, the better 
the illumination, the greater the accuracy, especially where the illumination 
is on the same angle as the offender.  Stephen J. Ross, Colin G. Tredoux, & 
Roy S. Malpass, (2015) Evaluating Eyewitness Testimony of Adults 513, 527. In 
I. B. Weiner & R. K. Otto (Eds.), The Handbook of Forensic Psychology (4th ed.). 
Boston, MA: Credo Reference.  Even a slight lengthening of viewing time 
with good illumination will improve the visual information obtained by an 
observer.  Identifying the Culprit at 50-51.  And more important than time of 
-12- 
exposure is the type or amount of attention given by the witness.  Gary L. 
Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 227, 
282 (2003).  If a witness has a reason to pay close attention, the accuracy of 
the identification increases.  Id.   
 Second, the physical distance between the two is an important 
estimator variable, directly affecting the eyewitness’ ability to discern visual 
details, like the offender’s features.  Id. at 92.  Distance is inversely 
proportional to the accuracy of the later identification, especially where the 
offender was previously unknown.  Ross et al. at 527.  In other words, the 
closer the two individuals, the more accurate the identification.  Id.   
 Third, the direction of the observer’s gaze affects identification 
accuracy, with visual acuity being at its best “at the observer’s center of 
gaze.”  Identifying the Culprit at 51, 56.  “The center is the part of your visual 
system that is used for fine sensing, such as” “scrutinizing faces in a social 
context.”  Id.  Both the “quality and quantity of information sensed a mere 
10 degrees from center are far less than what is available at the center of 
gaze.”  Id.; see also id. at 52-53 (matters on the periphery—not within the 
center of gaze—do “not reach awareness” or are “not perceived” as 
accurately).  And viewing a face from an angle can distort facial features.  Id. 
at 56.  Hence, accuracy increases when the witness’ center of gaze and the 
-13- 
offender are at the same level.  Moreover, research suggests that an 
emotional response narrows attention at the expense of peripheral details.  
Wells & Olson, Eyewitness Testimony at 282; see also Gary L. Wells, Amina 
Memon, & Steve D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative 
Value, 7 Psychol. Sci. in the Publ. Int. 45, 54 (2006). And the ability to process 
is increased with fewer objects competing for attention or more distance 
between the objects.  Identifying the Culprit at 54.  For example, when a crime 
occurs in a “visually complex scene” like a sporting event, the ability “to 
accurately perceive the facial features of a perpetrator” may be lessened.   
Id. 
 Lujan summarily dismisses the first ten seconds of his contact with 
Oney.  He notes only that the two were 8 to 9 inches apart for 5 to 7 seconds, 
Oney was startled and would have had little reason to pay attention, and 
the event occurred in poor witnessing conditions.6  Resp.Br. 10-12,16,20.  
Proper application of the above factors to the first ten seconds of contact, 
however, points strongly to a high degree of accuracy in Oney’s 
independent memory of Lujan as the robber and, hence, a very low degree 
                                              
6These and many other of Lujan’s factual references differ from those 
made by the State. The difference may be explained by Lujan’s primary 
reliance on and citation to the preliminary hearing testimony while the State 
relies on the trial evidence. 
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of suggestibility from the one-man showup, just as Oney testified.  R357:49-
50,94,95,106-07 (Oney’s explanation that he based his showup identification 
on Lujan’s looks).     
 According to Oney, the two were face-to-face about ten inches apart 
for “a good 10 seconds” or “longer.”  R357:39-40.  As Lujan was a stranger, 
the minimal distance suggests a significant increase in the accuracy of 
Oney’s identification of Lujan 30 minutes later.  Ross, et al. at 527.  There 
were no distortions attributable to differing heights or angles as the two 
were face-to-face.  Matters on the periphery—such as hair and clothing—
were not in Oney’s “center of gaze” where his visual acuity was at its best, 
and were, therefore, likely processed less accurately, accounting, in part, for 
the discrepancies as to those factors.  There was no evidence of any 
distractions—noise, people, or movements—and there was nothing 
“visually complex” about the scene.   
 Lujan calls Oney’s initial exposure to Lujan “startling” and suggests 
that Oney had “little reason” to pay close attention.  Resp.Br. 11-12.  
However, the unexpected appearance of an unknown trespasser in Oney’s 
personal space at a time and place where no one would have been expected 
prompted Oney to afford Lujan his undivided attention and gave Oney a 
significant opportunity to view Lujan from the most advantageous 
-15- 
perspective.  The stress level was neither very high nor very low at that 
point, and Oney was not only emotionally committed to the situation but 
exclusively focused on the man in front of him—looking to the stranger to 
enlighten him about his presence—and thereby adding to the accuracy of 
his later identification.  See Wells & Olson, Eyewitness Testimony at 282 
(discussing widely-accepted Yerkes-Dodson Law which provides that only 
very high and very low levels of stress or arousal impair memory). 
2.  Weapon focus.   
 Lujan contends the accuracy of Oney’s identification would be 
adversely affected by his focus on what he believed was a weapon in the 
robber’s waistband.  Resp.Br. 10-11,13.  But the robber never brandished a 
weapon that would cause a distraction.  Weapon focus describes a situation 
in which the observer’s “attention is compellingly drawn to emotionally 
laden stimuli, such as a gun or a knife, at the expense of acquiring greater 
visual information about the face of the perpetrator.” Identifying the Culprit 
at 55.  Research on its effects on eyewitness identifications is inconclusive 
and the effects are inconsistent.  Id. at 93; Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence at 
53.  At least one analysis determined that the presence of a weapon had a 
“larger effect” on accuracy in threatening scenarios than in non-threatening 
ones.  Id.  Moreover, the adverse effects are believed to appear only in very 
-16- 
high or very low stress situations.  Id. at 94-95; Wells & Olson, Eyewitness 
Testimony at 282.   
 By these standards, any impairment from weapon-focus in this case 
would be minimal, if existent at all.  No weapon was brandished.  The 
robbery involved a non-threatening scenario where the only weapon threat 
was implied and was unaccompanied by a verbal threat.  Despite the 
implied threat, Oney’s focus was not solely on Lujan’s waistband but 
broadly encompassed “the whole person” as he shifted back and forth 
between Lujan’s face and his arm.  R357:36-37; see R357:56-59 (Oney’s focus 
included robber’s height, which Lujan matched).  Even if Oney gained no 
further visual information about Lujan’s face once a weapon was implied, 
he had already spent several long seconds focusing directly on Lujan’s well-
lit, undisguised face in unexpected but non-threatening circumstances with 
no suggestion of a weapon, providing ample basis for his later 
identification.   
3. Own-race bias.   
 Lujan claims that the mere fact that Oney and the robber were of 
different races commands exclusion of the identification evidence, citing to 
the “stunning and robust” evidence on this point.  Resp.Br. 19-20.    
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 That “robust” evidence, however, is anything but conclusive.  Own-
race or other-race bias is the phenomenon where faces of people of races 
different than an eyewitness’ are harder to accurately identify than are faces 
of people of the same race.  Identifying the Culprit at 96; Kareem J. Johnson & 
Barbara L. Fredrickson, We All Look the Same to Me, 2005 Psychol Sci, Nov. 
16(11). Own-race bias does not mean cross-racial identification is necessarily 
wrong or erroneous; it simply increases the risk of error.  Andrew E. Taslitz, 
“Curing” Own Race Bias: What Cognitive Science and the Henderson Case Teach 
About Improving Jurors’ Ability to Identify Race-Tainted Eyewitness Error, 16 
Legislation and Public Policy, 1049, 1053.   While it occurs across a range of 
races, ethnicities and ages (Identifying the Culprit at 96), studies have 
determined that “the risk of misidentification is greatest where the victim is 
white and the defendant is African American.”  Harvey Gee, Book Review: 
Eyewitness Testimony and Cross Racial Identification, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 835, 
840 (2001).  See also  Taslitz, 16 Legislation and Public Policy at 1052-53 
(evidence suggests bias “might be somewhat worse when whites are 
identifying persons of other races.”); Mark Rith, Looking Across the Racial 
Divide: How Eyewitness Testimony can Cause Problems, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette (12/26/10) (studies show that cross-race effect is “worse for people 
in a majority population group”); Johnson & Fredrickson, 2005 Psychol Sci, 
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Nov. 16(11) (own-race bias is “most pronounced for Caucasians viewing 
members of racial minority groups”) (citing “Meissner & Bringham, 2001”).  
This suggests that the effect is somewhat less where, as here, the witness 
and the perpetrator are neither white nor black.   
 The risk is less in a number of other circumstances relevant here:  (1) 
when the observer is between the ages of 20 and fifty rather than at either 
end of the age spectrum (Ross et al. at 526; Wells & Olson, Eyewitness 
Testimony at 280); (2) when  a quick verbal description of the face is given 
shortly after viewing it (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race 
Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 Psychol., Pub. 
Pol’y, & L. 230, 232 (2001)); and (3) when the interval between the initial 
observation and the initial identification is shorter (id.; Identifying the Culprit 
at 96, 98-99).   
 Further, a number of studies have found that both the quantity and 
the quality of time spent around members of another race increase memory 
performance, with the contact showing a “small, yet significant effect” that 
has increased over the years.  See Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, 
Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 7 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & Law 3, 8, 21-22 (2001); see also 
Bryan S. Ryan, Alleviating Own-Race Bias in Cross-Racial Identifications, 8 
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Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 115, 127 & nn. 54, 57 (2015) (describing “interracial 
contact theory” as the “most widely accepted theory” concerning own-race 
bias); Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 
Conn. L. Rev. 1, 35 (2000)(studies show that the own-race bias phenomenon 
is “particularly caused by a lack of familiarity with people from other ethnic 
groups”).  Numerous studies show that living in integrated neighborhoods 
produced better recognition of “novel other-race faces” than living in 
segregated neighborhoods and that individuals with self-reported 
experience with other races demonstrated a better memory for other-race 
faces. Thirty Years of Investigating, 7 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & Law 8. 
 Based on these authorities, Oney’s lengthy exposure to and 
familiarity with the high density of Hispanics in his neighborhood (R357:43-
44, 100-01), his age, the circumstances of his initial exposure to Lujan’s face, 
and the quick verbal description he provided shortly after the robbery, 
minimize the adverse impact of the cross-racial component of Oney’s 
identification.7 
                                              
7The fact that Oney and both counsel used the terms “Spanish,” 
“Mexican” and “Hispanic” interchangeably does not undermine Oney’s 
description of the robber.  Rspd.Br. 20. Regardless of the technicalities 
behind the terms, they are often used interchangeably in the United States.  
See Marcela Hede,  Hispanic v. Latino, July 18, 2013; Hasa, Difference Between 
Mexican and Hispanic, October 12, 2015; Juan Arredondo, Why You Should 
Give The Term “Hispanic” The Middle Finger, October 26, 2016.   
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4. Certainty.    
 Lujan claims the circumstances of the showup falsely inflated Oney’s 
certainty in his identification.  Resp.Br. 17-19.  He argues that a suggestive 
showup will inflate the certainty of an eyewitness’ identification and alter 
the eyewitness’ memory to support the inflated level of certainty.  Id.  
Research suggests that the witness can become more certain in his 
identification over time, resulting in a weak relationship between 
eyewitness confidence and accuracy at trial.  See John T. Wixted, et al., The 
Reliability of Eyewitness Confidence: Initial Eyewitness Confidence Reliably 
Predicts Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, American Psychologist, 70, 515 
(2015).     This case did not follow that pattern, however.  Four months after 
the showup, Oney identified Lujan as one of two familiar faces in a lineup, 
demonstrating a decrease in his certainty level.  Clearly, no alteration of 
memory occurred, suggesting the showup was not as suggestive as Lujan 
would have this Court believe. 
 Moreover, there is increasing authority for the belief that a strong 
relationship exists between initial confidence levels and accuracy in an 
eyewitness identification.  See id.  Wixted explains that post 1996 studies 
indicate that first time identifications made with high confidence are 
associated with high accuracy—typically 80% correct or higher.  Id. at 518.  
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So while confidence at the time of trial is not a reliable predictor of accuracy, 
a witness’ confidence at the initial identification may well indicate greater 
accuracy.  Id. at 524 (citing National Research Council, 2014, p. 74).   
 The question is whether Oney’s confidence in his identification at the 
showup was the result of the setting or of his personal memory from his 
earlier exposure to the robber.  The totality of the circumstances suggests 
the latter.  In addition to the favorable witnessing conditions of Oney’s 
initial exposure to Lujan, the minimal passage of time before the initial 
identification, and the absence of anything except “normal agitation” 
affecting Oney’s mental capacity or state of mind, Oney testified that he 
identified Lujan at the showup because of his looks.  R357:49-50,94-95,105-
07.  Lujan seeks to minimize, if not eliminate, consideration of this 
testimony, but he cites to no other case in which such testimony was given, 
let alone rejected as incredible.  Resp.Br. 17,n.1.   
 Oney explained that his memory the night of the robbery was better 
than it was months later at the lineup and said that he identified Lujan at 
the showup because “[e]verything compares.”  R357:49-50,94-95,105-07. In 
other words, the jacket, the beanie, and the other visual cues provided by 
the suspect himself compared favorably with Oney’s fresh memory and 
prompted Oney’s initial identification.  He did not mention the spotlights, 
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handcuffs, and other factors comprising the setting for the showup.  See id.  
His assessment of Lujan’s looks was corroborated by Officer Bias, who 
testified that Lujan matched the initial description of the car thief “very 
well.”  R357:136-37,141-42;R359:18. And Oney’s confidence in that 
identification reinforces his reliability and weighs heavily against the 
suggestiveness of the initial showup.  See generally Wixted, et al., American 
Psychologist  70, 515-26.  
 Confidence was eliminated by this Court as a separate factor in 
evaluating the reliability of eyewitness identification.  State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 490 (Utah 1986).  But this Court later recognized that it may make it 
slightly more likely that an identification was reliable.  State v. Guzman, 2006 
UT 12, ¶22. Given the most recent research establishing a strong positive 
relationship between initial identification and confidence, Oney’s positive 
affirmation of the basis for his identification, and the factors presented in 
the State’s opening brief weighing against the suggestiveness of the police 
identification procedure in this case, this Court should find that under the 
totality of the circumstances, Oney’s identification of Lujan was based on 
his personal memory and, hence, was sufficiently reliable, to be presented to 
the jury despite the showup setting.   See Pet.Br. 29-49 (Arguments IC-D).   
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5. Oney’s verbal description.   
 Finally, the accuracy of Oney’s initial description of the robber must 
be considered in light of the circumstances under which it was given.   
 Lujan claims the record does not show that the initial investigation 
was rushed.  Resp.Br. 15-16.  However, while the police responded within 
minutes of the robbery, Oney’s discussion with Officer Bias about both the 
robbery details and the suspect’s description lasted only “a matter of 
seconds” during which the officer tried to get a “general brief description of 
the suspect.” R357:118-20;R359:30-31.  Despite the officer’s intent to “ask 
more in-depth questions,” he was distracted by his discovery of a “fresh 
trail of liquid.”  Id.  Believing that “time was of the essence in tracking this 
wet trail of liquid to find the vehicle and possibly the suspect,” Officer Bias 
“ended [his] investigation with Mr. Oney with the intent of completing that 
investigation…later in time.”  Id.   
 The rushed description may reasonably account for the absence of a 
mention of the robber’s goatee.  The discrepancy may also be explained by 
the circumstances of the interaction between the two men.  While the 
overhead and side lighting in the car were sufficient to allow Oney to see 
the robber’s face against the darkness outside the car, they may have been 
insufficient to permit him to see the delineation of his “scraggly” salt and 
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pepper facial hair.  See R.358:56 (defense expert explaining close proximity 
may obscure some things); Ross et al. at 527 (lighting matching angle of 
observation leads to more accurate identification).   
 Similarly, research suggests the hair discrepancy may be explained 
because it constitutes visual information on the periphery and not at the 
observer’s “center of gaze” and, hence, may not have been fully perceived 
by the observer.  Identifying the Culprit at 52-53.   This gives credence to the 
prosecutor’s argument that Oney may have mistaken the black collar of the 
jacket for hair extending from under the black beanie.  R362:13.   
* * * * * 
 In sum, the reliability of eyewitness identification can depend on a 
large number of interdependent factors.  A number of the circumstances 
surrounding the identification in this case suggest increased accuracy—or at 
least no decrease in accuracy—and, taken together, demonstrate that 
whatever suggestiveness attached to the showup, Oney’s identification of 
Lujan was sufficiently likely to have been based on his original observations 
and memory so as to render the identification constitutionally admissible at 
trial.  In the end, the reliability of Oney’s identification properly rests with 
the jury, not the court. 
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III 
A FINDING OF STATE ACTION AND A SUBSTANTIAL 
LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE SUGGESTIVENESS 
TRIGGERS A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF REVIEW; 
THE COURT OF APPEALS MAJORITY ERRONEOUSLY 
FOUND REVERSIBLE ERROR UNDER THAT STANDARD 
 The State maintains the position stated in its opening brief: Oney’s 
identification was constitutionally admissible and no further review is 
warranted.  Aplt.Br. 48-52.  However, even under the heightened federal 
standard, any error in admitting Oney’s identifications was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ¶45 (“Where 
the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right, we apply a 
higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless we find the 
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).   
 Lujan mischaracterizes the State’s case in the absence of the 
challenged identification testimony.  Like the court of appeals, Lujan argues 
that without the testimony, the State “loses its strongest evidence” and it’s 
case “is severely weakened.”  Resp.Br. 37,39.  In fact, both Lujan and the 
court of appeals fail to recognize that exclusion of the challenged 
identification testimony would have altered the significance and weight 
afforded other evidence, providing additional support for Lujan’s 
conviction: specifically, that the sole remaining identification would gain 
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elevated significance and lend added credibility to the victim and to the 
State’s case.   
 Lujan challenged only the admission of his in-court and showup 
identifications.  See Resp.Br. 37,39.  See also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶9;  
Aplt.Br. 7, n.2 (acknowledging and excusing trial counsel’s failure to 
challenge admission of lineup identification).8  Thus, for purposes of a 
harmlessness analysis, this Court must presume that the jury would have 
heard the lineup identification.  The jury would have been told that four 
months after the robbery, Oney identified two suspects from an eight-man 
lineup, one of whom was the only person actually located within minutes of 
the early-morning robbery a short distance from the stolen car in clothes 
matching the victim’s description and uttering words strikingly similar to 
the few words the robber had uttered to the victim.  From a juror 
perspective, then, the only identification testimony presented would have 
been entirely accurate, thereby bolstering Oney’s credibility.  Thus, 
omission of the challenged identification evidence reasonably would have 
strengthened the State’s case.    
                                              
8Lujan excused the absence of a challenge the lineup identification as 
a matter of trial strategy.  Aplt.Br. 7, n.2.  The more likely reason is the fact 
that the lineup was held at defense counsel’s insistence over the State’s 
objection.  R18-27,30-35.  A challenge might have been seen as invited error. 
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 Moreover, concern about the discrepancies in Oney’s initial 
description of the robber would have been tempered by three facts:  (1) 
Oney provided a description of both the suspect and the robbery details 
within only “a matter of seconds” (R357:118-19;R359:30); (2) studies 
establish the difficulties in accurately processing peripheral information 
outside the “center of gaze”; and (3) Oney later successfully identified a 
man who was, in fact, found near the stolen car the morning of the robbery 
and who largely matched the hurried verbal description. 
 Lujan’s limited and self-serving view of the evidence omits much of 
the evidence beneficial to the State.  Resp.Br. 37-39.  First, he mistakenly 
declares that there is no support for the reasonable inference that he was the 
only individual the officers found the morning of the robbery.  Id. at 39.   
Officer Bias explained that he typically worked the graveyard shift in that 
area and that no specific foot traffic stood out in his mind on that morning.  
R359:5-6.  He also explained that he responded to Oney’s call within 
minutes of the robbery and moved extremely quickly to find a suspect, 
believing that after he found the liquid trail left by the stolen car, “time was 
of the essence.”  R359:30-31.  In his experience, a suspect will ditch a stolen 
car, run a few hundred yards, and hide.  R357:24.  Given the likelihood that 
the suspect was still near the car, the officer quickly called for additional 
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police units to establish a containment area using a large, intentionally-
visible police presence in hopes of catching a suspect.  R357:22-24.  They not 
only located a single suspect, but Officer Bias described him as meeting 
Oney’s description “very well,” including his height, weight, build, 
ethnicity, hat, and jacket.  R357:137;R359:11,18-19. Under these 
circumstances, the fact that only Lujan was found is significant.   
 Second, Lujan predicts that absent the challenged evidence, the State’s 
case and the credibility of the State’s officers would be undermined by 
testimony from a defense witness that he never heard of clothing being 
misplaced at the jail during the time he worked there.  Resp.Br. 37.  The jury 
rejected that testimony below, and there is no reason to believe that the 
absence of the challenged evidence would alter that fact.   
 A county jail clothing officer [“officer #1”] testified that, during 
intake, a coat and hat would be listed on a clothing inventory sheet and that 
he did not remember anything being misplaced in his three years on the job.  
Id. at 37;R359:64-65,69,72,75.  But this officer only testified about the general 
inventory process and did not claim to have worked on Lujan’s intake. See 
R359:61-75.  
 The officer who transported Lujan explained that Lujan wore both a 
black beanie and a black jacket when he was arrested and when he arrived 
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at the jail.  R359:46-48. Neither item was listed on Lujan’s inventory sheet, 
and Detective Davis, who picked up Lujan’s clothing from booking the next 
day, explained that he received neither item.  R359:50-52.  When he returned 
to the jail to look for them, he was given the hat, despite its absence from the 
inventory sheet. Id. He asked for the jacket but was told they could not find 
it.  R359:52-53.  The stipulated testimony of the clothing officer who looked 
for the missing items and found only the hat confirms Davis’ testimony.  
R359:101-02. These case-specific facts suggest that the testimony of officer 
#1 was inaccurate as to this case.  Thus, instead of damaging the State’s 
case, these facts and the testimony of Oney and two officers who remember 
that Lujan wore a black jacket when arrested are persuasive evidence that 
the black jacket existed, and permit the reasonable inference that the jacket 
was subsequently misplaced. R357:141-42;R359:46-47,58,95-96. 
 Third, Lujan echoes the court of appeals’ view that the State’s case 
would suffer from evidence that the K9 led officers to portable classrooms, 
not to Lujan.  Resp.Br. 38-39. See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶18. The evidence 
and its reasonable inferences showed that the dog followed Lujan’s scent 
from the abandoned car and led the officers in the direction in which Lujan 
was ultimately found, stopping en route at the classrooms only because it 
-30- 
was unsafe to continue through the potentially dangerous expanse without 
doing a sweep in case of an ambush.   
 The dog identified a scent at the abandoned car, pulled hard on its 
leash, and unerringly followed the scent across the schoolyard, all 
indicating that he had “picked up on a track of the person that they [were] 
looking for.”  R357:128.  There was no hesitation or other tell-tale sign of 
confusion suggesting multiple scents or multiple trails.   
 The path crossed the classrooms before reaching Lujan.  Because the 
suspect could use the classrooms to ambush officers, and the handler could 
not manage the dog and use his weapon together, progress slowed to allow 
a safety sweep of the area.  R357:128-29;R359:17,26-27.  The precaution does 
not show that the dog was not following Lujan’s path, that it intentionally 
diverted from that path, or that any officers had already veered off only to 
later find Lujan independent of the traced scent.  It shows only that the 
officers took control of their advancement for their own safety.  R359:26-28.   
 Once Officer Bias heard a noise, he alone left the others to complete 
their safety sweep, even though he recognized that, for safety purposes, it 
“was probably poor tactics” to do so.  R359:27-28.  Following the noise led 
the officer to the HVAC units, which were along the same line of sight from 
the car as the classrooms.  Id.  There was no evidence that the dog sought to 
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follow the scent in any other direction.  In fact, the dog’s conduct upon 
arriving at the scene—barking and focused on Lujan to the point of scaring 
him—suggests that Lujan’s was the scent he had been following.  R357:132-
33;R359:18.  Properly viewed, this evidence suggests that the jury is likely to 
find that Lujan’s discovery at the end of the path decisively taken by the 
police dog from the stolen car is a significant factor in favor of conviction.  
R359:27.   
 Finally, Lujan ignores his own conduct which contributed to his 
conviction.  The morning of the robbery, he claimed to have called 911 to get 
police to come help him.  R359:22-23.  But when found, he simply stared at 
the uniformed officers when they repeatedly ordered him to come out.  
R357:132-34.  He also produced two cell phones which showed a single 911 
call made in 2004.  R359:53-56.  Further, he revealed a verbal link with the 
robber upon discovery: he stated, “[S]omebody is following me”—the very 
concern the car thief expressed in Oney’s driveway—“Why you following 
me? Why you following me?”  R357:18,77;R359:8,22.   
 In sum, absent the challenged identification evidence, the evidence 
still established that at 4 o’clock on a November morning shortly after a car 
robbery in a residential area to which Lujan had no connection, the police 
found a man matching Oney’s verbal description of the robber “very well,” 
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who was of the same ethnicity, height, and weight, who wore a black beanie 
and a black jacket as described by the victim, and who was in fact later 
identified by the victim as one of two potential suspects at a photo lineup.  
He was found within minutes of the robbery, on the opposite side of a 
schoolyard adjacent to the stolen car, and at the end of the path decisively 
taken by the trained K9 directly from the stolen car.  When discovered, his 
conduct and his cell phones contradicted his claim that he requested police 
help, and he uttered to an officer a paraphrase of a statement made by the 
robber to the victim half an hour earlier.  
 This compelling evidence amply supports Lujan’s conviction and 
demonstrates that any error in the admission of Oney’s showup and in-
court identifications of Lujan would be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the State’s opening 
brief, the Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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 Respectfully submitted on November 16, 2016 . 
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